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Corporate  governance  (CG)  international  measures  have  continued  to  receive 
much discourse in leading journals and corporate magazines, also more attention 
on  the  national  and  international  levels.  During  the  last  couple  of  years,  CG 
mechanisms  for  local  and  international  firms  in  corporate  ownership  have 
promoted  an  array  of  inquisitive  research  aimed  at  identifying  successful 
corporate  mechanisms  for  institutions  in  both  less  developed  and  developing 
countries. To that extent, this dissertation seeks to critically examine well known 
international  measures  in  furthering  CG  mechanisms  for  development.  And 
whether  pursuing  CG  standards  and  incorporating  them  in  firms’  strategies  or 
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corporate governance  (CG)2  theoretically  in various divergences whose premises 
have  shaped  the conceptualization of CG  from  the perspectives of  shareholders 
and proprietors in corporation ownership. This perspective has a connection with 
Jensen and Meckling3  view that corporations are nexus of contracts that bring the 
various  principal  participants  in  harmonious  transactions  which  allow  the 
shareholders  much  power  over  corporation  assets.  With  the  influxes  of  the 
various treatises on CG from researchers and scholars4, CG appears to be on high 
priority  on  agendas  of  many  developed  countries  including  the  less‐developed 
countries  (LDCs)  and  the  developing  countries.  Some  of  these  treatises  are 
engrossed  in  various  attempts  to  provide  the  state  of  CG  using  models  and 




Africa  of  institutional  investors  regard  CG  as  more  important  than  a  firm’s 
                                                 
1 See generally A A Berle and G C Means, "The Modern Corporation and the Private 
Property", (1932),   New York: Harcourt Brace. 
2 The words  ‘firms’, ‘corporates,’ ‘corporation(s)’, and ‘companies’ are used 
interchangeably in this dissertation 
3See generally M. Jensen, and M. Meckling, "The Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure", (1976),   JFE, 3: 305-360 
4 These studies include Berle and Means (1932), Coase (1937, 1960), Alchian (1965), 
Demsetz (1964), Cheung (1970, 1983), North (1981, 1990),La Porta and others (1997, 
1998), Becht, Bolton, and Röell (2003), Claessens and Fan (2003), Denis and McConnell 
(2003), and Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001). 
5 See Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) pp.57-64, pp.277-284 




CG  is  the  basis  for  accelerating  profit  maximization  of  firms,  better  firm 
performance and economic growth of a nation. Thus, poor CG environments with 
the wake  of  corporate  debacles  have  plagued  reputed  corporations  across  the 
world  such  as  the  Enron, WorldCom  including  the  East  Asian  financial  crisis  of 
1997–1998 that appear  a ‘vogue outlook’ to the field of CG, have prompted much 
concerns because of their ‘economic corporate woes’7. One of such concerns lies 
with  international  and  country  measures  to  review  compliance  mechanisms  in 
corporations in LDCs that have wider business networks and business reputations. 
To  that  extent, while  previous  scholarly  studies8  have  extensively widened  the 
scope  of CG with  various  paradigms, most  of  these  paradigms  are  not  attuned 
with  the  nature  of  laws,  norms  and  traditions  characterizing  corporations  in 
developing countries.   
 
The  fact  that corporations cannot work without good governance  frameworks  is 
strongly  canvassed.  As  Adrian  Cadbury  rightly  pointed  out,  corporations’ 
operations  are  confined  with  a  governance  framework  that  is  defined  by  law, 
regulations,  corporation’s  constitutions  [ethical  practice],  including  by 
shareholders who  own  and  provide  fund  to meet  their  expectations  by  agents 
[managers]9.  In  most  cases,  governance  framework  is  varied  from  country  to 
country with respect to history and culture including rules and institutions. Hence, 
                                                 
6McKinsey and Company, McKinsey Global Investor Opinion Survey on Corporate 
Governance 2002: Key Findings, available electronically at 
<http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/organization 
leadership/service/corpgovernance/pdf/globalinvestoropinionsurvey2002.pdf> accessed on 
10 July 2012 
7 By this phrase, it depicts corporate crisis and CG failures amid the financial crisis  
8 See Jensen and Meckling, (n.2); Becht, et al, (2002); Denis and McConnell, (2003); 
Hermalin (2005); GCGF (2005, 2009); and Jaffer, et al.( 2007) 
9 In a foreword to Claessens (2003) study, Adrian Cadbury averred that corporations are 
managed adopting internationally accepted governance standards that would help agents 
meet the economic and social goals, individual and society goals of corporations and of 
which these goals are targeted at attracting investment through a governance framework 
that encourages the efficient use of resources and the accountability of those resources 
used. For a critique, see Claessens(2003) p. vii 
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Certainly  CG  in  developed  countries  has  comparatively  triumphed with  various 
impacts  from  leading  CG  institutions  such  as  European  Corporate  Governance 
Institute (ECGI) in cooperation with International Corporate Governance Network 
(ICGN)  and  the  Global  Corporate  Governance  Forum  (GCGF)11  and  other 
institutions  like  Organization  for  Economic  Co‐operation  and  Development 
(OECD)12  working  to  strengthen  CG  in  member  states.  One  issue  that  has 
continued  to  elicit  debate  and  intense  discussions  is  the  adoption  of  best  CG 
codes  for  institutions  in  ACs,  developing  countries  and  LDCs13.    These  codes 
appear  significantly  relevant  to  the  solidification  of  governance  frameworks  to 
shape shareholders and stakeholders models of CG in such a way that the goals of 
corporations  are  met.  Against  this  background,  the  much  discussed  lack  of 
sufficient enforcement and institutions in the LDCs are obvious obstacles to good 
CG  for  corporations  and  as  such  weak  enforcement  is  incapable  of  attracting 
                                                 
10 Ibid  
11 The GCGF was co-founded by the World Bank (WB) and the OECD as an advocate and 
disseminator of high standards and practices of CG across the globe especially in 
developing countries. GCGF supports initiatives at reducing the vulnerability of 
developing and emerging markets to financial crisis, and also provide incentives for 
corporations to invest and perform efficiently in a manner that is transparent, sustainable, 
and socially responsible. See GCGF's activities 
at<http://www.gcgf.org/wps/wcm/connect/Topics_Ext_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_
Site/Global+Corporate+Governance+Forum> accessed on 1 July 2012 
 
12 OECD has continued to strengthen corporations’ CG which appears to be widely 
acclaimed. In 2004, OECD adopted four principles of CG which include fairness, 
transparency, accountability, and responsibility. These principles represent the widely 
acceptable basis on which CG practice can be assessed. For a review, see OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance (Paris: OECD) Available 
at<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf> accessed on 29 June 2012 
13 CG codes have remained the basis for enhancing business activities and CG reforms 
through efficient legal frameworks for corporations. However, implementation and 
enforcement remain parts of the challenges to institutionalization of these CG codes in 
domestic laws. See Wong (2008) and GCGF (2005)   for critiques.  
F1006                                                                                         ICGFREL Dissertation 
 
 13





• What are the measures, both at the national and  international  levels, put 
in place in enhancing CG for development; and  
• Are there any successful CG mechanisms for any LDC?     
The  need  to  investigate  these  research  questions  is  relevant  to  augment  the 
bodies  of  research  towards  CG  and  development  for  LDCs  in  order  to  garner 
useful  contributions  to  improving  the  support  for  good  CG  in  LDCs.  Thus,  this 
study  aligns with models  of  shareholders  and  stakeholders’  CG mechanisms  in 
which the success of any corporation depends on the corporation owners and the 





Since  this  dissertation  is  mainly  structured  to  look  at  CG  and  economic 
development in LDCs and developing countries, descriptive approach is employed 
in  the  research.    Descriptive  research  is  concerned  with  the  relationships  and 
practices  that exist, beliefs and processes  that are  still ongoing, effects  that are 
being  felt,  or  trends  that  are  developing  or  advancing16,  reflecting  on  the 
development of CG and developing countries  including  the LDCs. Therefore,  the 
                                                 
14 External finance has strongly been pointed out as an index for stimulating high CG 
performance and financial development of firms for growth. See Carlin and Mayer (2000) 
and Mayer (2000). For investment, the in-flow of investment is an indicator for improved 
corporate performance for firms. For a discussion, see WB, “World Development Report 
2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone” (New York 2004), Chapter 4. 
15 Cf. E Berglöf, and S Claessens,  "Corporate Governance and Enforcement" in, I M 
Millstein et al., "Enforcement and Corporate Governance: Three Views Global Corporate 
Governance ", (2005), GCGF, Focus 3,  Washington, DC: The World Bank p. 53   
16 W Trochim, “Research Methods Knowledge Base” 2nd edition.(Cincinnati, OH:     
Atomic Dog Publishing, 2001) 




and  uses  the  results  of  scientific  foundations which  are  on  the  basis  of  library 






classification  which  describes  the  LDCs  as  impoverished  in  terms  of  low  gross 
national  income  (GNI),  weak  human  assets  and  high  degree  of  economic 
vulnerability. There are forty‐eight countries designated by the UN as LDCs while 
developing  countries  are  those  not  specified  in  the  list  of  LDCs  which  are 
geographically spread across Africa, Oceania, Europe, Asia and America.18    It has 
been established  that around 12 percent of  the population of  the world  lives  in 
the LDCs,  leaving more  than half of  the world's population  in  the extreme‐poor 
category  with  less  than  2  percent  of  the  LDCs  making  the  world's  GDP,  and  
                                                 
17 A substantial number of developing countries have been classified accordingly into low-
income criterion, human resource weakness criterion and economic vulnerability criterion. 
By low-income criterion, developing countries are gauged on a three-year average estimate 
of the gross national income (GNI) per capita (under $750 for inclusion, above $900 for 
graduation), by human resource weakness criterion, they are measured on composite 
Human Assets Index (HAI) based on indicators such as (a) nutrition; (b) health; (c) 
education; and (d) adult literacy; and while by economic vulnerability criterion,  indicators 
of the instability of agricultural production; the instability of exports of goods and services; 
the economic importance of non-traditional activities (share of manufacturing and modern 
services in GDP); merchandise export concentration; and the handicap of economic 
smallness are applied. For a list of developing countries into these criteria, see Nation 
Online, "Least Developed Countries (LDCs)" available 
at<http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/least_developed_countries.htm> accessed on 
26 June 2012. There are vast challenges of development facing these LDCs that forced 
many of LDCs governments to adopt various measures toward industrializing their 
economies. For  critiques of these development challenges, see generally J Y Lin and M 
Liu, “Development Strategy, Viability and Challenges of Development in Lagging 
Regions”, (2003) A Paper presented at the 15th World Bank’s Annual Bank Conference on 
Development Economics held in Bangalore and India in May 2003. 
18For a review on LDCs and developing countries, see United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development(UNCTAD), “The Least Developed Countries Report 2011: The 
Potential Role of South-South Cooperation for Inclusive and Sustainable Development”, 
(2011) UNCTAD, p.XI 
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LDCs  in  the  global economic  crisis  and  its  aftermaths were occasioned by  their 
sophisticated regional trading partners and a resilient diversified export pattern20. 
While  it  is  clear  that  the  LDCs as a group did not encounter any  contraction of 
economic activity, a fifth of them did not enter into a recession during the global 
economy meltdown  in which  18  LDCs  in  2009  saw  their  growth  rate  on  a  per 
capita  basis  negative  and  only  9  LDCs  in  2010  leaving  six  LDCs  experienced  a 
contraction  of  economic  activity  in  per  capita  terms  between  2009  and  2010 
consecutively21. Thus, as it has been projected based on the indications on growth 
rates,  the  LDCs  are  likely  to  experience  on  average  almost  5.8  percent  growth 
rates from 2009 to 2016, which means LDCs as a group are not likely to reach the 
target  of  7  percent  growth  rate which  is  one  of  the  fundamental  goals  of  the 
Istanbul  Programme  of  Action  (IPoA)22  for  periods  between  2011  and  2020. 
However, on  country  level, only 10  LDCs out of  the 48  listed  LDCs  are  likely  to 
                                                 
19 See D Bhattacharya and S. Hossain, "Least Developed Countries in the Next Decade 
What is there in the Istanbul Programme of Action?", (2011) International Policy Analysis 
| FES Geneva, p.3 
20  See "Recent Economic Trends and Long-Term Outlook and Development Perspective" 
in Ibid, pp. II-III and p.5  
21 Ibid  
22 The IPoA was developed "to  “to overcome the structural challenges faced by least 
developed countries in order to eradicate poverty, achieve internationally agreed 
development goals and enable graduation from the least developed country category” 
through encouraging national policy actions and international support, that focus on 
fundamental issues such as (a) achieving sustained, equitable and inclusive economic 
growth in LDCs of at least 7 per cent per annum; (b) building human capacities; (c) 
reducing the vulnerability of LDCs to economic shocks and disasters, as well as climate 
change, and strengthening their resilience; (d) ensuring enhanced financial resources and 
their effective use; and (e) ensuring good governance at all levels. The IPoA action plan is 
initiated to help half of the LDCs to reach the criteria for graduation by 2020. For a review, 
see "Introduction" to Ibid, p.II. It is also understood that there are substantial measures in 
form of global partnership taken to fast-track the development of the LDCs from various 
angles pursued by the Group of Eminent Persons (GEP) created by the UN, Brussels 
Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001‑2010 
(BPoA), and civil society organizations (CSOs) from Europe, Africa, Asia and the Pacific 
highlighting a number of concerns to the LDCs.  For a detailed critique of these concerns, 
see D. Bhattacharya and S. Hossain (n.19) pp. 4-18.  





a  standard  of  that  was  higher  in  2011  that  saw  LDCs  economies  grew  by  4.9 
percent  in comparison to 2009 figure on the average annual real gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita growth rate during the boom period, which was one of 
the  forecasts  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  that  LDCs  would 
experience a slower economic growth in 2011, in which it appears, comparatively, 
that developing countries and emerging economies outperformed than the LDCs 
by  average  growth  rate  of  7.3  percent  in  2010  and  6.4  percent  in  2011 
respectively as illustrated in the table 1 below24.   
 






  2008 2009 2010 2011  2008  2009  2010 2011 
Total LDCs  6.5  4.6  5.7  4.9  4.1  2.3  3.4  2.6 
   African LDCs and Haiti  7.3  4.5  5.2  4.7  4.6  1.8  2.6  2.1 
   Asian LDCs  5.4  5.1  6.3  5.2  3.5  3.3  4.5  3.4 
   Island LDCs  8.1  ‐1.9  5.1  5.4  5.9  ‐3.9  3.0  3.2 
Memo items:                 
   Emerging and developing 
economies 
6.0  2.8  7.3  6.4  4.5  0.8  5.8  4.6 
   Advanced economies  0.1  ‐3.7  3.1  1.6  ‐0.7  ‐4.5  2.5  0.9 
Source: UNCTAD, “The Least Developed Countries Report 2011: The Potential Role 
of South‐South Cooperation  for  Inclusive and Sustainable Development”,  (2011) 
UNCTAD, p. 3 
 
                                                 
23 See Ibid, p.III and p. 5 
24 See Ibid, pp.2-3 
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As  it has been projected by  the  IMF,  the LDCs economies would not be able  to 




and  6.8  percent  respectively.  However,  the  African  LDCs  are  projected  to 
stimulate the economic recovery of the region in the middle‐term range which will 






















                                                 
25 Ibid  
26 See Ibid, p.5  






















result  of  their  specialized  and  narrow  economic  structure  as  shown  in  the27. 
Indeed,  on  graduation  status,  it  is  pleasing  that  11  LDCs  show  signs  of  high 
probability  of  reaching  the  graduation  criteria  toward  the  end  of  the  current 
                                                 
27 Ibid 
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and economic development.   Corporations  at  country  level  are often  seen  as  a 
more  efficient  solution  to  local  development,  particularly  micro  and  small 
incentives that do not require large investments that support economic growth by 
creating  jobs  and  supporting  community  through  their  corporate  social 
responsibility  (CSR)29  for  economic  and  social  development.    They  also  play  an 
important  role on environmental  levels, because of  the benefits  that may  result 
from  their  actions  towards  the  environment  as  a  result  of  their  business 
activities30.  Thus,  it  is  important  that  firms  sustain  their  social,  economic  and 
environmental  roles  as  measures  for  sustainable  development  in  developing 
countries with strong strives in employment because it is the key to prosperity, as 
Professor Aneel Karnani succinctly argues that  it  is “the key  link between growth 
output  and  poverty  alleviation”31.  However,  the  emergence  of  corporations  in 
developing countries and LDCs is constrained by the presence of corruptions, lack 
of  framework  conditions  for  regulating  corporations  and  attracting  finance  to 
                                                 
28 See Ibid, p.9. There are arguments that the exposure of economies of the LDCs and 
developing economies to trade  have left them to external shock and less vulnerable to 
internally generated shocks. For a critique, see generally W Easterly, R Islam and J E 
Stiglitz, "Macroeconomic Paradigms for Less Developed Countries Shaken and Stirred: 
Explaining Growth Volatility", (2002) The World Bank electronically available at 
<http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/growth%20volatility%20jan%202000.html> 
accessed 10 July 2012. Trades to LDCs have seen much impact. For a detailed discussion, 
see World Trade Organization/OECD, "AidforTrade and LDCs: Starting to show Results", 
(2011) OECD/WTO   
29 For studies regarding corporations support local development and economic growth, see 
N J Duarte and F J Diniz, The Role of Firms and Entrepreneurship on Local Development 
in the Region of Vale Do Sousa; C M Vargas, "Community Development and Micro-
enterprises: Fostering Sustainable Development", (2000) , 11-26; P Mccann, "On the 
supply-side Determinants of Regional Growth" (2006) Construction Management and 
Economics, 681-693; and S M Islam, M Munasinghe, and M Clarke, "Making Long-term 
Economic Growth more Sustainable: Evaluating the Costs and the Benefits" (2003) 
Ecological Economics, 149-166. 
30 See N J Duarte and F J Diniz “The Role of Firms and Entrepreneurship on Local 
Development ", (2011) RJRS 5, 1: 54 - 69 
  
31 Cited in B Jenkins(2007) p.8 
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literature  on  CG  and  development,  including  economic  development  for 
developing countries and  the LDCs. Secondly;  it highlights  the  factors associated 
with weak  CG  and  good  CG measures. And,  thirdly,  for  policy makers,  political 
institutions [governments] and corporations in the LDCs and developing countries, 
















                                                 
32 A number of studies have advanced various barriers to the emergence of sound CG 
measures in developing countries. For example, see  S F Chowdhury and C A Mallin, 
“Barriers to Good Governance in Developing Countries: The Case of Bangladesh”, (2012) 
International Centre for Financial Regulation (ICFR) Series on Corporate Governance in 
Emerging Markets – Conference Proceedings 2012. 
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suffer  collapse  in  larger  proportions  hit  by  intense  adverse  shocks  due  to 
ineffective legal institutions to enforce good CG measures33. In view of this, it thus 
appears that LDCs and developing countries  including  international organizations 
are  greatly  pursing  for  the  advancement  of  good  CG  by  institutionalizing  best 
practices  for  local  and  international  firms  in  order  to  increase  their  access  to 
capital  and  investments.  Therefore,  the  aim  of  this  study  is  to  investigate 








Zambia  falls  within  the  LDC  category  that  made  it  first  attempt  to  introduce 
effective  CG  after  the  Institute  of  Directors  (IOD)34  in  Zambia  started  plans  to 
strengthen  CG  in  small  and  medium  enterprises  (SMEs)  and  enlighten  public 
governmentals on  the  concept of CG.  For  the  SMEs  in  Zambia,  the  IODS's plan 
provided a suitable system of CG that led to the development of a model of CG for 
better firm performance, which provided shareholders with maximum profits thus 




                                                 
33 Johnson et al present that weak legal institutions to ensure minority protection 
consequently affect the way exchange rate depreciates and stock market declines that was 
typical in the Asian financial crisis For a reference, see S Johnson et al., “Corporate 
Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis (2000), 58 JFE, p.141 
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Lusaka  Stock  Exchange  Corporate  Governance  Code  by  Lusaka  Stock  Exchange 
(LuSE) and the  IOD have shaped the CG practice by ensuring that Zambia’s  legal 
framework  work  to  protect  shareholder  rights  and  boards  conform  to 





The Philippines  as  a developing  country  is  seen  as one of  the  'newly‐appearing 
economies' whose economy has been stirred up towards creating and developing 
CG  in  two  approaches37.  The  first  approach  is  a  scoring  system of CG  that was 
created  in order  to develop  the  standards of CG  for  the  country's  companies38. 
This  scorecard  serves  as  basis  for  evaluating  firm's  performance  depending  on 
public disclosure of firm’s  information, and how those disclosures of  information 
are published. As  it has been pointed out, this scoring system approach has saw 
firms  identifying  their  own  stand  in  respect  to  the  criteria  of  CG  and  also 
comparing their stands with other firms in the Philippines, and indeed the world39. 
Thus,  apart  from  this  system  allowing  corporations  to  evaluate  their  own 
performance,  it gave them the chance to  identify the areas to reach to maintain 
an  improved  system  of  CG.  On  the  other  hand,  the  second  approach  was 
                                                                                                                                                   
34 The IOD was launched in 2000 by the then Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry, 
Mr. William. Harrington to promote high standards of CG in both the private and public 
sectors in Zambia through education and workshops. For a background of IOD, see "Brief 
on the Institute of Directors of Zambia" at <http://iodzambia.org/about%20us.aspx> 
accessed on 10 July 2012 
35 See Ma’atoofi and Ahmadian (2011) p.242 
36  See WB, "Corporate Governance Country Assessment Zambia" (2006) Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) World Bank Available at < 
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg_zam.pdf > accessed on 20 July 2012 
37 See Ma’atoofi and Ahmadian(n.35), p.243 
38 Ibid  
39 Ibid  






capital  market40.    The  Philippines  has  also  been  identified  for  insider  trading 
where  is  impractical  to  obtain  evidence  to  prosecute  those  involved  in  insider 
trading41.  
 
The WB42  country  assessment  report  for  the  Philippines  has  observed  that  the 
Philippines  have  significant  reforms  to  establish  good  CG  with  large  legal  and 
regulatory framework for CG, but its implementation and enforcement need to be 
strengthened  in order to achieve a more  transparent, accountable, and efficient 
corporate  sector  including  a  more  robust  stock  market,  through  the  following 
steps, such as: 
• “Strengthening  the  enforcement  of  the  existing  laws  and  regulations  by 
the SEC and PSE, particularly  those  involving  insider trading,  tender offer 
rules, and disclosure; 
• Improving  the  protection  of  minority  shareholder  rights  through  better 
enforcement; 
• Strengthening  monitoring  of  compliance  with  IAS/IFRS  and  requiring 




• Encouraging  the  development  of  advocacy  institutions  to  promote 
                                                 
40 Ibid  
41 Insider trading is an expropriation self-dealing technique used to achieve profitable 
trading by listed companies based on insider information. See T Nenova, "A Corporate 
Governance Agenda for Developing Countries", (2005) World Bank Group No. 217, p.194 
42 The WB conducts country assessments under the Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) initiative with a view to strengthening the country’s 
corporate governance framework. For a number of countries assessed, see Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) electronically available at< 
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg.html>accessed  on 20 July 2012  







States  appear  to  have  gained  a  larger  discourse  as  a  result  of  development  of 
corporate  law  and  theories  that  reflect  a  broader  portion  of  regulation  of 
corporate  organization,  management,  and  finance44.  This  reflection  was 
occasioned  by  the  court  and  judgements  especially  in  Delaware.  However, 
comparatively,  there  are  no  practical  evidences  in  developing  countries 







of  Vale  Do  Sousa  and  firms  in  Finland  witnessed  growth  that  encourages  the 
striving of sound CG through entrepreneurship48. 
 
                                                 
43 See WB, "Corporate Governance Country Assessment Philippines" (2006) Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) World Bank Available at < 
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg_phl_07.pdf > accessed on 20 July 2012 
 44 See generally  L E Mitchell, The Relevance of Corporate Theory to Corporate and 
Economic Development: Comment on The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on 
Corporate Personality Theories, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1489 (2006) 
<http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol63/iss4/9> accessed on 11 August 2012 
45 There are practical evidences supporting corporation growth in advanced countries 
against developing countries. For example in Finland, there are the presence of legal 
determinants and innovation and knowledge that encourage firm growth and emergence of 
new firms. For a detailed discussion of these determinants for Finnish firms, see generally 
A Rantala, "Growth of New Firms: Evidence From Finland 1996-2003", (2006)   Pellervo 
Economic Research Institute Reports No. 197, 1-120 
46 See N Brandt, “Business Dynamics in Europe", (2004) STI Working Paper 1/2004, 
OECD, Paris. 
47 See P Arvanitidis, G Petrakos, and S Pavleas, "Determinants of Economic Growth: the 
Experts' View", (2007) Congress of European Regional Science Association. Paris. 
48 For a detailed account of these factors, see Rantala (n.45) and for the Portuguese region 
of Vale Do Sousa, see N J Duarte and F J Diniz (n.30) 





CG  in  LDCs  and  developing  countries  as  well  as  developed  countries  has 
traditionally been associated with the “principal‐agent” or “agency” problem. As it 
has  been  established,  a  “principal‐agent”  relationship  arises  when  the  person 
[shareholder] who  owns  a  firm  is  not  the  same  as  the  person  [manager] who 
manages or controls  it. Therefore,  investors or financiers (principals) usually hire 
managers  (agents)  to  run  the  firm  on  their  behalf with  the  aim  of maximizing 
shareholder’s  returns  on  their  investment49.  Managers  on  the  other  hand,  are 
expected  to  judiciously use  investors’  funds  to manage  the  company. Based on 
this orientation, there is a separation between the financing and the management 
of the corporation, in such a way that it provides a separation between ownership 
and  control  as  evidenced  in  Berle  and Means's50. While we  cannot  ignore  the 
term,  CG  has  been  used  in many  different ways  and  patterns;  the  term  varies 
widely  connoting  the widely held  frameworks of  shareholders and  stakeholders 
mechanisms of CG which are often associated with economics aspect concerning 






of  the  firm and also able  to  stimulate  shareholder value, while  the  shareholder 
approach recognizes that business ethics and stakeholder relations can also have 
an  impact  on  the  reputation  and  long  term  success  of  the  corporation53. 
                                                 
49 Kiel and Nicholson (2003); Blair superficially argues that the onus of corporations exist 
to maximize shareholders’ wealth and make actions of hired managers accountable. See 
Blair (1995)   
50 Berle and Means observe that the availability of superior information to hired 
professional managers appears succinctly to have overpowered the right of control from 
firm financiers over hired managers. See Berle and Means (n.1) 
51 See Maher and Anderson (1999) p.6 
52 Ibid  
53 Ibid  
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Therefore,  the  two  models  are  interchangeably  linked  with  enhancing 
corporation’s CG for firm performance with emphasis on disclosure.  
 
There  are  theoretical  underpinnings  of  corporations  provided  by  Professor 
Harris54.  The  grant  theory  of  corporation  has  intensely  been  discoursed  and 
argued.  It  is  the  theory  that  assumes  that  corporations  are  the  creation of  the 
state and as  such  they possess  some  state  features  that started  to make waves 
before  the end of  the Civil War  in  the United  States. The  collapse of  the  grant 
theory gave room to the enactment of general incorporation laws that provide the 
state  the  alternative  opportunity  to  create  corporations.  However,  Professor 
Harris's postulations of the grant theory have been critiqued by Mitchell55. While 
corporations are created by laws, the shareholder model of CG and stakeholders’ 





For  corporations  in  LDCs  and  developing  countries,  the  core  objective  of 




governance of  the  firm, managers are bound  to  run  the corporation  in  the  sole 
interests of shareholders who hired them. In a narrow sense, the principal‐agent 
relationship whose premises have fostered the operations of CG by shareholders 
and  hired  managers  and  directors,  the  separation  of  beneficial  ownership  are 
often  aligned  to  shareholders  while  executive  decision  making  lies  with  the 
managers. This has often created  loggerheads  in which shareholders expect firm 
                                                 
54 See R Harris, The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality 
Theories: From German Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big 
Business, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421, 1424-25 (2006) (indicating normative 
qualities of a "real entity" theory). 
55 Mitchell(n.44) 





often  pre‐occupied with maximizing  their  executive  pays, market  share  or  any 
other  particular  interest  different  from  investors[firm  owners].  Therefore  since 
managers are not the investors, they do not bear any outcome of investment lost, 
full agency cost or  reap  the benefits of good  firm performance,  thus  resonating 
separation  of  ownership  and  control  that  leaves  the  agents  and  principals’' 
interests  unaligned.    As  result  of  this  unaligned  interests  of  firm  owners  and 
managers,  one  of  the  central  critiques  of  the  shareholder  model  of  the  firm 
remains  implicitly  the  ensuing  conflict  of  interests  leading  to  dispersed 
shareholders  which  often  within  falls  as  one  of  the  main  CG  problems  in  the 
principal‐agent  context  with  dispersed  ownership56  affecting  the  place  of 
institutional investors, shareholder protection, and executive compensation etc. 
 
As  it  has  been  argued,  the  principal‐agent  CG  problem  is  a  vital  aspect  of 
"incomplete  contracts"57  and  as  such,  there  is  the  tendency  that  the  principal‐
agent problem would not have arose should there be a possible way of writing a 
"complete  contract", which will allow  the  investor  state  in a  contract  signed by 
managers specifying how funds should be used and how the returns are shared58. 
Thus, this would have given the investor the grounds to align his interests with his 
manager on basis of  trust, accountability and  transparency. However,  complete 
                                                 
56Dispersed ownership in CG depicts either an individual or an institution [stakeholder] 
does not hold a large stake in a single corporation.  Mayer describes this as "outsider 
system". A dispersed ownership encourages the adoption of new technologies which can 
attract resistance from other stakeholders. Concentrated ownership on the other hand, is 
highly used in Europe and it is associated with activities that entail investments by other 
stakeholders.   See Mayer (2000) p.74 for reference. It is also observed that concentrated 
ownership is the rule for largest listed companies especially in developing countries where 
the average firm is predominantly majority controlled and significant corporate assets are 
controlled by small families in Asia, Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and 
other developing countries. For a reference, see T Nenova, (n.41) p.183; see also The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan(ICAP), "Instituting Corporate Governance 
in Developing, Emerging and Transitional Economies", (2006) p.11 
57 The “incomplete contract” context remains a strong view in Coase (1937), Jensen and 
Meckling (n.3), Fama and Jensen (1983a, b), Williamson (1975, 1985), Aghion and Bolton 
(1992), and Hart (1995) which has often been identified the reason for conflict of interest 
arising in agency cost between managers and investors.  
58 See Maher and Anderson (n.51) p.6 










The  stakeholder  model  of  CG  is  often  primarily  concerned  with  how  effective 
different  governance  systems  work  in  advancing  long  term  investment  and 




result of  the place of  stakeholders  in CG, Blair  contends  that CG  is  an  array of 











responsible  institutions engage  in public  interest and are accessed according  to 
their  deeds  in  market  share,  growth  in  trading  relations  with  suppliers  and 
purchasers including their overall financial performance. However this traditional 
stakeholder model has been criticized  because it is almost impossible for firms to 
                                                 
59 Ibid  
60 Ibid  
61 Williamson (1985) 
62 Blair(n.49)  
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fulfil  these wider objectives,  in which Blair has pointed out  that  the  traditional 
stakeholder  model  idea  obviously  does  not  provide  a  clear  guidance  to  assist 
managers  and  directors  on  how  to  set  priorities  especially  how  corporate 
resources  are  beneficially  used  and  as  such  there  is  no  clear‐cut  mandate  on 
enforcement  mechanism  towards  ensuring  that  stakeholders  live  up  to  their 
responsive roles to the corporation63.    
 
On  the  other  hand,  a modern  [new]  stakeholder model  appears  to  have  been 
espoused  widely  which  give  credence  to  firms  whose  stakeholders  such  as 
suppliers,  customers  and  employers  work  vigorously  in  commitments  to  firm's 
goals  and  objectives.  This  new  approach  sees  contributions  to  corporation's 
success  as  a  result  of  teamwork  and  collective  efforts  from  various  resource 
providers of human and capital. Therefore, CG serves  to encourage cooperation 
amongst  stakeholders  in  creating  wealth,  jobs  and  sustainability  of  financial 
systems which are often the basis upon which firm performance is judged. Hence, 
for  firms  in  developing  countries  and  LDCs  to  put  into  effect  a  greater  firm 
performance,  stakeholders must work  hand‐in‐hand  by  developing  a  long  term 
relations  among  themselves  incorporating  both  trust  and  commitments64.  The 





While  the  stakeholder  model  is  strongly  supported  due  to  the  enshrined 
cooperation among all stakeholders  in  the corporation,  there are still enormous 
hurdles  working  against  evolving  a  socially  efficient  investment  levels  in 
corporation governance process by all stakeholders. The  lack of frameworks and 
mechanisms  that  entails  efficient  levels  of  investment  is  a  strong  hurdle  to 
ensuring stakeholder investment and harmonious cooperation by all stakeholders. 
However the absence of a formidable clear‐cut stakeholder objective should not 
                                                 
63 See Ibid, p. 203 
64 See Mayer (1996) 
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prevent  clear guidance on how  the  companies' objectives and priorities are  set 
out.  Illustrating  the  stakeholder model  in  any  typical  corporation, Abdullah  and 











It  is  clear  that  the  evidences  provided  for  Zambia  and  the  Philippines  are 
indications  that  CG  practice  in  developing  countries  is  taking  new  shapes. 
However,  a more  practicable measure  is  needed  through  effective  reforms  for 
enforcement and  implementation of sound CG measures that would bring about 





                                                 
65 See Abdullah and Valentine (2009) p.92 
66 Abdullah and Valentine study is characteristically influenced by Donaldson and Preston 
(1995) work.  








broader perspectives.  It has gained an  intensive study  from economics, business 
[law],  finance and accounting perspectives.   However,  there  is no consensus on 










Construing  a  consensus  definition  of  CG  is  inconsequential.    As  one  paper 
observes CG does not  serve an abstract goal, but  in existence  serves  corporate 
purposes  by  providing  a  structure  by  which  stockholders,  directors  and 
management  would  be  able  to  pursue  effectively  corporation  objectives  that 
shape corporate goals68. Thus, studies69 have focused on considerably on what CG 
development  tend  to  substantiate  using  different  CG  models  related  to  issues 
especially issue of cooperatives in developing and developed countries70. 
 
There  are  many  perspectives  conceptualizing  the  meaning  of  CG.  The  first 
perspective with legal orientations, views CG as: 
                                                 
67 See generally V R Ramon, "Corporate Governance as Competitive Advantage in Asia: 
Managing Corporate Governance in Asia", (2001) Asian Institute of Management, 
Philippines.  
68 US Business Round Table White Paper (1997) on CG: this paper categorically in explicit 
terms espouses what CG system seeks to accomplish in line with corporation objectives.  
69 See Wong (2008) and Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) classical works  
70 Shaw (2006) 









considered  important by  judges, which was effectuated  in the  landmark decision 
of the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom72. The customs in CG are 
often  viewed  as  norms  which  guide  the  way  and  manners  judges  interpret 




a wider  interpretation of shareholder primacy which  is considered a norm  in US 
CG  system73.  Therefore, CG  encompasses  the  combination  of  laws,  regulations, 
listing rules that form the corporate behaviors of board and guide their actions as 
to  how  to  run  a  corporation  in  order  to  attract  capital,  perform  efficiently, 
maximize shareholders returns, and whose decisions are geared towards meeting 
corporation's legal obligations including its general societal expectations.  As it has 
been  argued,  these  laws  and  regulations  are  provided  in  a  corporate  law  that 
serve as framework for decision making process  in a corporation to minimize CG 
                                                 
71 See US Legal, “Corporate Governance Law and Legal Definition”, electronically 
available at < http://definitions.uslegal.com/c/corporate-governance/> accessed on 20 July 
2012  
72 For a critique regarding the Smith v. Van Gorkom, see D Honabach, “Smith v. Van 
Gorkom: Managerial Liability and Exculpatory Clauses—A Proposal to Fill the Gap of the 
Missing Officer Protection”, (2006) WLR 45.  Macey increasingly argues that process 
plays a big role in American CG. It allows judges and lawyers a comparative advantage to 
construct and evaluate process. However they err on how these processes can be injected 
into the realities of CG due to the huge economic costs of process in terms of income and 
status. Thus a process-based approach to CG is a challenging task to lawyers.  For a 
detailed review, see J Macey, “Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken”, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press 2008. Pp.30-2.  
73 The place of norms for CG cannot be overstressed as it serves as actual sources for legal 
rules, and they evolve over time without any resort to market intervention. Macey provided 
intense critiques on the importance of norms. For a review, see Macey (n.72) pp. 33-44  
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problems  in  firms which  are  highly  complex  and  contextual  in  varying  degrees, 
often which these problems result to ‘inevitable judicial rhetoric’74.  
 





for  as  long  as  there have been  corporate entities.  This process  seeks  to 






much equity  finance  into  the activities of hired managers expecting  them  to act 
for  the  sole  interests  that  govern  the  aspirations  of  stakeholders  working 
cooperatively  for  the good purpose of  the corporation. This  is why  the  study of 




                                                 
74 See J Macey, “The Nature of Conflicts of Interest within the Firm”, (2006) Journal of 
Corporation Law 31, p.616. It is important to note that regulations as to how the firm is run 
are codified in firm’s bylaws and charters which govern relationship between shareholders 
and managers, on the basis that a mandatory rule is favored because it supports investor 
protection by lowering the agency cost in securing new capital by managers. For a review, 
see generally J Macey, “Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Contractual 
Perspective”, (1993). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper1607. Available 
at<http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1607> accessed on 14 July 2012   
75 See Jaffer, et al. (2007) p.2 
76 LLSV (1997) 
77 This is because as Monks and Minow argue that CG is a relationship among various 
players [participants] whose actions are geared toward determining the direction and 
performance of corporations. These participants include the shareholders, the management 
and the board of directors. For a review, see generally R A Monks and N Minow,   
“Corporate Governance”, (2001)2nd ed, Blackwell Publishing 




Understanding  CG  from  two  perspectives,  the  World  Bank  defines  CG  from  a 
corporation  perspective  which  dwells  on  the  relations  between  the  owners, 
management board and other  stakeholders[the employees,  suppliers,  investors, 
customers and communities] thus obliging the board of director with the task of 
balancing  the  interests  of  all  stakeholders  to  sustained  long  term  values.  This 
perspective  has  been  reinforced  in  many  definitions  of  CG  especially  in  the 
definition offered by Professor Akinboade in which he referred CG as: 
 
“the  manner  in  which  the  power  of  a  corporation  is  exercised  in  the 
stewardship of a corporation’s total portfolio of assets and resources with 
the  objective  of  maintaining  and  increasing  shareholder  value  and 
satisfaction of other stakeholders in the context of its corporate mission"78 
 







 "the  private  and  public  institutions,  including  laws,  regulations  and 
accepted business practices, which  together govern  the relationship,  in a 
market  economy,  between  corporate  managers  and  entrepreneurs 
                                                 
78 Cited in Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) workshop on Economic and Corporate 
Governance and Accountability in Southern Africa, 2005, Ethiopia, p.6. The workshop 
highlights CG challenges facing state-owned enterprises and including the financial sector 
in Southern Africa such as lack of political will in the implementation of CG in the 
financial sector, ethical/profit maximization dilemma, Lack of human and financial 
capacity, weak/Inadequate governance framework, inadequate/Inappropriate legal 
framework, inadequate capitalization/resource. See ECA (2005) pp.33-6 for 
recommendations to these challenges.  
79 See WB, “Corporate Governance: Framework for Implementation, Overview”, 1999, 
www.worldbank.org 
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behalf  of  investors  and  suppliers  [shareholders].  Second,  it  tends  to  suggest 
authoritatively that CG success lies with the amount of investment and resources 
provided  for  the economic growth of  corporation and  the  community  it  serves. 
Hence,  CG  in  corporation  exists  to  stimulate  economic  growth  of  the  residual 
country.  These  investment  drives  and  resource  capitals  are  strengthened  by 
institutions  in  CG  that  provide  the  premises  on  which  the  purpose  of  CG  is 
understood.  As  Oman  pointed  out,  these  institutions  serve  two  fundamental 
objectives81.    Firstly,  as  key  stimulators  of  economic  wealth  and  growth,  they 
contribute to the overall performance and conformance of firms, by ensuring that 
managers and entrepreneurs have  the  right business environment  that  leads  to 
greater  firms' operational efficiency, which can  stimulate  returns on  investment 
and  productivity  growth  on  a  long‐term  basis82.    Secondly,  by  corporate 
conformance,  they  ensure  that  every  activity  of  managers  conforms  with 
investors' and society's  interests  ,by creating a ground that encourages  limits on 
abuse of power,  funds mismanagement, significant moral hazards occasioned by 






                                                 
80 See Oman(2001) p.13  
81 Ibid  
82 Ibid  
83 Ibid  
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The  importance  of  CG  for  development  is  very  fundamental  as  it  is  the  pre‐
condition  for  economic  growth  and  development  with  a  strong  inter‐link  of 
property right, enforcement of contracts and presence of rule of law as antidotes 
to  economic  development84.  As  it  has  been  argued  extensively,  improved  CG 
potentially  contribute  to  increased  flow  of  capital  and  also  lower  the  cost  of 
domestic and  foreign  financial  resources  to  firms  to a  significant point85.  It also 
reduces  the  amount  of  wastage  occasioned  by  misallocation  of  investment 
resources  which  are  major  constraints  to  sustained  productivity  growth  and 
national  development  in  developing  countries86.    Hence,  improved  CG  is  an 
antidote  to  growth  and development,  as performance of  firms depends on  the 
governance practices of board87.      In addition, effective CG has  indicated  that  it 
has  the  ability  to  impact  upon  development  at  a  macro  level  by  enabling 
corporations  access  to  finance  and  as  such,  it  induces  global  and  local  flows of 
capital which  in  no way  lowers  the  cost  of  capital,  leading  to  better  corporate 
performance  and  higher  corporate  valuation.  Hence,  this  creates  financial 
stability, enhances both economic growth and development that eventually  lead 
to a favorable treatment of all stakeholders88. In contrast, the absence of effective 
CG  structure  at  country  and  firm  level,  including  the  absence  of  firm  legal 
determinants  for external  finance  to corporations can  significantly constrain  the 
flow of external capital and resources and hamper the willingness of financiers to 
investment89.   
                                                 
84 Property rights, enforcement of contracts, and rule of law are significant factors for 
economic development. For a discussion, see generally H De Soto, "The Mystery of 
Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else" (Transworld 
London 2001); WB, "World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for 
Everyone" (New York 2004), Chapter 4; R Messick, “What Governments Can Do to 
Facilitate the Enforcement of Contracts “(2005), Public Sector Group World Bank, 
electronically available at 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/ContractEnforcement
Cairo.pdf> accessed on 10 July 2012; K Dam, "The Law-Growth Nexus: The Rule of Law 
and Economic Development" (Brookings Institution Press Washington DC 2006).  
85 See Oman(n. 80) p.18 
86 Ibid  
87 See Clarke (2004); Kiel and Nicholson (2002); OECD (1998) 
88 See S Claessens, Focus 1: “Corporate Governance and Development” (GCGF-World 
Bank Washington DC 2003), p.1. 
89  There are greater emphases for finance, because it contributes to economic growth of a 
nation in an environment where there are good CG environments. See T Beck, R Levine 





Having accounted significantly  in this dissertation that CG  is of great  importance 
for national development,  in helping  to  increase  the  flow of  financial  capital  to 
firms  in developing countries and equally  its potential benefits of  improved CG, 
understanding CG  issues  in developing economies  is  complex. Many developing 
countries specifically African states started to give attention to good governance 
in  the onset of 1980s  that appeared  to have evolved  the concept of CG  in  their 
domains90.   As Rwegasira argues,  the  concept of CG does not appear  to be  the 
best solution for developing countries because of the number of problems faced 
by  them  such  as  political  instability  of  regimes,  low  per  capita  incomes  and 
diseases91.  Thus,  these problems  require  an  elaborate  solution before  adopting 
concepts of CG92. Furthermore, a number of studies have argued that the Anglo‐
American model  type of  theoretical propositions of a  strong  legal  system and a 




                                                                                                                                                   
and N Loayza, Finance and Sources of Growth (2000), 58 JFE, p.261; R Levine, Finance 
and Growth: Theory, Evidence and Mechanisms, in P Aghion and S Durlauf (eds.), 
Handbook of Economic Growth (North-Holland Elsevier Publishers Amsterdam 2004). 
See also T Beck, A Demirguc-Kunt and R Levine, Law and Firms’ Access to Finance 
(2004), World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3194, available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=570365> accessed on 10 July 2012; A Demirguc-Kunt, Finance 
and Economic Development: Policy Choices for Developing Countries (2006), World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3955, Available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=923262> accessed 10 July 2012; and LLSV, Legal Determinants 
of External Finance (1997), 52 JF, p.1131. 
90 See generally J Solomon and A Solomon, "Corporate Governance and Accountability", 
(2004). Chichester: Wiley. 
91 See K Rwegasira, “Corporate Governance in Emerging Capital Markets: Whither 
Africa?” (2000) CGAIR, 8(3), 258-67.  Available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-
8683.00203> accessed on 20 July 2012 
92 See B M Mulili and P Wong, "Corporate Governance Practices in Developing Countries: 
The Case for Kenya", (2011) IJBA Vol. 2, No. 1, p.19 
93 These studies view that the ‘patternization’ of the local legal systems after the Anglo 
American’s is one of the reasons why the local legal systems in developing countries have 
not yet evolved a strong CG system compatible with local values but rather suggested that 
the stakeholder model of CG is appropriate for developing countries.   For a review, see 
Black et al., 2010; Ogbechie et al., 2009; Ogbuozobe, 2009 
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system  in  both  developing  and  developed  economies  is  a  constraint  explaining 
poor  and  weak  CG  as  ‘un‐antidote  slips’  to  investment  finance  to  local 
corporations94.   One special treatise that  is widespread  in CG  literature between 
the  developing  and  developed  countries  is  models  of  CG  in  which  there  are 
questions  that  arise  on  model  that  would  be  appropriate  for  developing 
countries95.  However,  according  to  Paredes,  one  of  these  models  is  market‐
oriented model, which is predominately concerned with both formal and informal 
mechanisms  such  as  incentive‐based  [executive]  compensation  and  hostile 
takeovers  to hold agents accountable  for  their  corporate actions and decisions. 
On the other hand, mandatory corporate law as a model, according to Paredes, is 
concerned with protecting  shareholders'  rights by opting  for  rules  that obligate 
the protection of  shareholder property  rights  into a corporate  law, which bores 
down  to  normative  framework  [legal]  of  CG.96    As  Paredes  suggests,  for 
developing countries, if the target‐goal is geared towards protecting shareholders' 
interests from abuses and mismanagement of directors and managers [insiders] in 
a  corporation,  then  countries  in  the  developing  world  should  resolve  to 
mandatory model of corporate  law  instead of relying on market‐oriented model, 










                                                 
94 Oman x-rays from an economic angle the unsound CG for developing and emerging 
countries struggling to maintain a sound financial system   as a result of weak judicial 
system, poor enforcement of rules and undemocratic political systems. All of these factors 
are hindrances to long term development.   See Oman(n.80), pp. 15-20 
95 See Mulili and Wong(n. 92) p.19  
96 See Paredes(2005) p.34 
97 See Paredes (n.96) pp.36-7 





One  of  the  main  issues  in  CG  literature  finds  that  developing  economies  lack 
executive institutions and trained personnel to enforce corporate laws as it relates 
to  shareholders,  management,  employees,  and  boards  of  directors  and  the 
general  implementation  of  these  laws98.  Another  case  for  institutions  in  the 
developing economies  is  that  financial  institutions  lack  the effective  framework 
rules  and  appropriate  financial  regulations  including  infrastructure  on  how  to 
make  their  financial participants  conform  to  those  rules within  the objective of 
maintaining  efficiency  in  the  financial  sector99.  Thus,  the  failure  of  these 
mechanisms  in place does not encourage good CG for  local corporations for firm 
performance.  On  the  other  hand,  on  market  oriented  model  in  developing 
countries,  as  the  observations  of  Paredes  point  out,  one  of  the  reasons  why 
market‐oriented model cannot be  feasible  for most developing countries  is  that 
they  lack  both  formal  and  informal  institutions  that  can  push  for  an  effective 
market‐based CG  system  that  is  characterized  by  an  enabling  corporate  law  to 
safeguard  mandatory  shareholder  protections100.  In  other  words,  with  the 
absence of advanced markets in developing countries, the mechanisms as seen in 
most developed countries like the United States, Canada, France and Germany for 
a market‐based  governance  system  cannot work  out  because  these  developed 
economies  have  reputable  and  strong  institutions  such  as  the  ECGI,  European 





market‐oriented  based  approach  in  terms  of  strict  laws  and  regulations, 
                                                 
98 See IFC (2010) p.12 
99 As it has been observed, rules for sustaining an incentive-based financial system is 
paramount for effective supervision and regulation that can be ensured through 
enforcement.  As Bossone and Promisel contend, these rules are capable of strengthening 
the financial system in developing countries and that only an efficient institution can create 
the environment. See Bossone and Promisel (1998) pp.2-27 
100  See Paredes (n.96) pp.36-7 










those  ambiguities  and  gaps  that  the  law  leaves  behind, which  can  be  covered 
[filled] through a  judgment or a case by case basis.102 Millstein further observers 
that  law  and  regulation  do  not  overtly  foresee  future  contingencies 
[eventualities],  and  as  such  there  are  tendencies  that  managers  and  directors 
could engage in unwholesome practices that are against the interests of investors 
[shareholders]  like  mishandling  the  company's  assets  and  defrauding 
shareholders.  
 
The  presence  of  highly  concentrated  oligopolistic  local  power  structures  is  a 
constraint to  improving CG  in developing countries. These  local power structures 
are often made up of oligopolistic coalitions with vested political  interests to stir 
public policy  in their favor103.   Furthermore,  judicial  institutions  like the courts  in 
the developing economies lack the will to enforce laws and contract as a result of 
their being under‐financed, unmotivated, or corrupt which do not provide  them 
hindsight  into    the  law  applicable  to  'refix'  a  failed  CG  system104.  Hence,  the 
presence of public  institutions  cannot be neglected  in  speeding up  the place of 
                                                 
101 Cf. E Berglöf, and S Claessens (n.15) p. 53   
102 Ibid., p. 3 
103  Oman describes the oligopolistic coalitions as ‘distribution cartels’ because of the 
enormous powers they command as a result of their role in country wealth [market share] 
and significant investment in both corporate-controlled and government resources which is 
possible to amount to strategic rivalry among the distribution cartels.  As it has been 
argued, the actions of distribution cartels are more or less destructive from any economy-
wide spectra whose behaviours are capable of hindering healthy inter-firm price 
competition and reducing aggregate country wealth but also at the same time help in 
resolving certain clear 'paradoxes’ of the development process involving large investments 
undertaken by corporations in highly capital-intensive production facilities. See Oman 
(n.80) pp.20-1 
104 See O Fremond and M Capaul (2002) p.27 
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Although  private  ordering  is  not  a  CG  legal  measure,  it  is  important  that  it  is 
legally enforced. As noted by Berglöf and Claessens, private ordering has a role in 
influencing  the  overall  effectiveness  of  CG  systems  because  it  dwells  on 
mechanisms  to  enforce  contracts,  which  are  critical  to  the  functioning  of  any 
economy  [market]  and  which  are  often  enforced  outside  the  judicial  system 
process.106 There is difficulty of having private ordering in developing economies.  
As  Parades  points  out,  for  developing  economies,  private  ordering  is  not  easy 
because  in  effect  one  cannot  turn  an  economy  'loose'  and  'instruct'  the 
parties[companies]  to organize  their  affairs  in  such  a way  that  they deem  it  fit 
albeit    it  is  provided  by  the  formal  corporate  law  on  general  governance 
framework. In contrast, for developed countries like the United States, Delaware, 
private  ordering  is  already  possible107.  Thus,  as  Paredes  concludes,  most 
successful private ordering  in developed economies overtly depends on a variety 
of  important  preconditions, which  are  not  often  the  case  for most  developing 
economies108.  These  conditions  are  provided  in  byelaws  that  make  it  easy  for 
shareholders  in  exercising  their  corporate  proxy  access.  In  some ways, we  can 
have  private  ordering  enforced  in  corporate  law  with  implications,  however 






                                                 
105 See D Rodik, “Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to 
Acquire Them” (2000), 35 Studies in Comparative International Development, p.59 
106These mechanisms range from unilateral, bilateral and multilateral arrangements, for 
details, see Cf. E Berglöf and S Claessens (n.15) pp. 22-58   
107 Rose (2010) 
108 Paredes (n.96) 





All corporate  institutions depend on public  law, and by public  law,  it deals with 
legal relationships of  insiders and outsiders  in specific  forms such as agency and 
contract, which are enforceable through a  legal mandate109. Legal mandates are 
vested  with  the  judicial  apparatus  of  the  state  and  how  those  mandates  are 
carried out depends on the stability of the state towards ensuring an effective CG 
system. As Paredes accounts,  there  is much skepticism  for  the market model of 
CG to be practicable for developing countries because of the relatively few  legal 
mandates  to work  it  out,  but  rather  the  future  has  to matter  if  this  could  be 
feasible110.  As  a  result  of  social,  political  and  economic  instability  that 
predominant  in  most  developing  economies,  the  future  prospects  of  those 
developing countries are likely to be 'heavily discounted' and 'worth less' than the 
"immediate benefits of shirking, looting, self‐dealing, and other disloyal behavior". 
Paredes suggests  that,  the  long‐term payoff  for  insiders engaged  in cooperating 





necessary measures  to create  the  level and environment  for  instituting a  sound 
CG especially  in the financial sector where these  institutions are required to play 





                                                 
109 For a critique of private laws on corporations and legal relationships concepts, see 
Smith, K and Keenan, D (1975) English Law 5th edition (London: Pitman Publishing 
Limited) p. 115 
110 Paredes (n.96) 
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Company culture  is a key component of the CG process for any corporation.  It  is 
the way companies carry out their corporate goals and objectives, and as such it is 
an embodiment of mindset, attitudes, experiences, beliefs, and shared values of a 
company.  As  Hladio  observes,  company  owners  and  business  leaders  often 
believe  that  their  company's  stated  vision,  mission,  and  core  values  are 
synonymous with  their  company's  culture112. However,  this  is  not  the  case  for 
most developing countries’ corporations often because of weakened corporation 
laws  and  codes, which  could  prevent  agents  from  effectively working  out  their 
CSR obligations to the society. Thus, it is important that stronger CG measures are 
encoded  into  corporation  laws,  legally  enforceable  to  encourage  managers, 










                                                 
111 See Oman(n.80) pp. 22-4 
112  Hladio further mention some steps to improve company culture by identifying the 
present company’s culture, providing an employee feedback loop and leadership, 
addressing conflicts quickly, and defining ownership of company culture. For a detailed 
discussion of these steps at improving company culture, see  M Hladio, "Tips for 
Developing Corporate Culture and Preventing Workplace Clashes", (2011) electronically 
available at <http://www.howtolearn.com/2011/04/tips-for-developing-corporate-culture-
and-preventing-workplace-clashes> accessed 11 August 2012 
 













It  can  be  established  that  there  are  a  number  of  challenges  facing  LDCs  and 
corporations  in the developing countries that have been  identified. The  issues of 
finance  and  external  investments  are  very  important  factors  affecting  firms  in 
developing countries. Finance and external  investments as a  form of  investment 
flows  are  pre‐conditions  to  be  met  to  accelerate  country  development  and 
economic growth.   Poor regulatory and  legal environments cannot support firms 
and minority protection113.   Hence,  for corporations  in  the LDCs and developing 
countries  alike,  a  good CG measure  should encourage external  finance  to  firms 
regardless of the fact that legal environments where corporations operate tend to 
be complex as a  result of  the conflicting nature of  local  laws and  regulations114, 
which  to  some  extent  are  not  in  cognizance  with  international  standards. 
Therefore,  corporations  cannot  emerge  if  there  is  absence  of  legal  framework 
conditions  for  economic  development  to  support  firms  to  perform  their  CSR 
obligations. 
                                                 
113 There are evidences supporting credits to corporations in developing countries and also 
evidences supporting weak regulatory legal systems as challenges to firms for the 
developing countries explaining why firms remain inactive. For a reference, see S M 
Cooper, “Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: Shortcomings, Challenges & 
Impact on Credit", (2007) Modern Law for Global Commerce. A paper delivered at the 
fortieth annual session of UNCITRAL in Vienna, on 9-12 July 2007; see also ICAP (n.49) 
p.18   
114 Regulations in many developing countries are a key challenge as a result of conflicting 
regulations which make it difficult for enforcement and as such, a lot of developing 
countries consider CG less important because of shortage of firms with widely traded 
shares.  See C Oman and D Blume, “Corporate Governance: A Development Challenge”, 
(2005). Policy Insights No. 3, OECD Development Centre. pp.1 and 3 





Good  CG  measures  are  often  associated  with  improved  legal  and  regulatory 
frameworks which are the basis for exchanging CG at country level including firm 
level.  Some  developing  countries  and  LDCs  appear  to  have  in  place  legal  and 
regulatory framework but require some bolstering steps  like the case of Zambia. 
On  the other hand, weak CG  system  in developing countries  is often associated 
with  lack  of  public  governance,  absence  of  rule  of  law  occasioned  by  political 





Although  CG  literature  dwelling  on  CG  development  in  LDCs  and  developing 
countries  suggest  that  countries  such  as  Zambia  and  the  Philippines  have 
introduced various CG measures  in  form of best codes of practice,  their success 
depends on enforcement and  implementation. Therefore, a CG mechanism  that 
encourages  all  stakeholders’  commitment  to  company’s  objective  can  help  to 





Successful  CG  mechanisms  depend  on  good  legal  frameworks  which  is  the 
bedrock for entrenching good CG measures in any country. Therefore, developing 
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CHAPTER  5:  INTERNATIONAL MEASURES OF  CG  FOR DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
AND LDCS 
 
Having  argued  extensively  that  corruption  and  poor  local  governance  are 
obstacles  to  economic  development  in  developing  countries115,  the  thrusts  of 
good  CG  cannot  be  accentuated  in  an  environment  riddled  with  corrupt  or 
unethical  practices  which  cannot  encourage  the  institutions  of  CG  for  local 
corporations.  Hence,  the  need  to  pursue  measures  both  at  domestic  and 
international  levels  for  CG  in  developing  and  LDCs  economies  cannot  be 
overemphasized. For most LDCs and developing countries  in Africa,  the ECA has 
articulated  some  measures  of  CG  development  which  form  the  basis  for 
promoting  sound macroeconomic  plans  including  strengthening  accounting  and 
auditing  systems as a key  factor  for economic policy objective. These measures 
represent  the  codes  and  standards  for  accelerating  economic  development       
and CG  to bolster public and private corporations  in maintaining  financial  flows.  
These measures include:  










It  is  important  to  point  out  these  codes  and  standards  for CG  in Africa  cannot 
make  much  impact  due  to  the  conflicting  regulations  that  exist  in  African 
                                                 
115 See generally C P Oman and C Arndt, “Measuring Governance”, (2010). Policy Brief 
No. 39, OECD Development Centre 
116 See  ECA, “Codes and Standards for Good Economic  and Corporate Governance in 
Africa:  Summary of Key Issues and Declaration  of Principles”, (2002) Economic 
Commission for Africa pp.8-10 
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regulatory  bodies  and  the  continued  spate  of  corruption,  which  will  make  it 
difficult to enforce these measures of CG codes.   By and  large, however, pursing 
these measures as a target for policy tools at country level is an effective way for 
developing  countries  to  drive  their  ‘lagging  economies’  into  prosperous  CG 
standards  for better  standards of  living of people  since  the WB has undertaken 




around  the  world  and  indeed  corporations  in  developing  countries118. 








                                                 
117 See generally WB/IFC/MIGA, “World Bank Country-Level Engagement on 
Governance and Anticorruption: An Evaluation of the 2007 Strategy and Implementation 
Plan”, (2007) World Bank 
118 For a view of  the OECD principles and their connotations,  see OECD (n.12).  The 
ICAP has contended that the OECD principles of CG do not apply to all corporations 
wholly to address CG issues. See ICAP, (n.56) p.11. The ICAP was established under The 
Chartered Accountants Ordinance of 1961 to regulate the fields of accounting and auditing 
professions in Pakistan for standard setting, quality control and investigation. For a review, 
see "About ICAP", electronically available at 
<http://www.icap.org.pk/web/links/0/abouticap.php> accessed on 20 July 2012 
 
119  The World Council for Corporate Governance (WCFCG) was formed in 2001 in New 
Delhi as an independent, not for profit international network aimed at galvanizing good 
governance practices worldwide by improving quality of CG in national economies. For an 
important about WCFCG, see "About us", electronically available at" 
<http://www.wcfcg.net/about.htm> accessed on 20 July 2012 
120 Since 1983, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) has been supporting 
local efforts worldwide aimed at promoting corporate governance by strengthening 
democracy through private enterprise and market-oriented reform. See "About us" 
electronically available at <http://www.cipe.org/about/overview-history> accessed on 20 
July 2012 
 










not  consequently  aware  of  impending  issues,  it  would  be  very  daunting  to 




for  any  developing  countries  and  LDCs,  political  institutions,  corporations  and 
policy makers must  take  into cognizance  the place of customs, norms,  legal and 




criminal procedures,  the  conceptualization of  corporation  is  a  legal  relationship 
between the shareholders and the managers, and this legal relationship should be 
enforced  by  state  laws,  corporations’  charters  and  bylaws  to  strengthen  the 







                                                 
121  See ICAP (n.56) p.29 




However,  it  does  not  appear  that  developing  countries  and  LDCs  have  these 
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           CHAPTER 6: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION   
 
Having espoused  critically CG and development  including CG  issues  in  the  LDCs 







economies  and  LDCs  especially  poorest  developing  countries  where  there  is  a 
huge constraint to  investment and external finance due to poorly equipped  local 
structures  and  absence  of  regulatory  institutions  for  CG.  Efficient  regulatory 
institutions  for  capital  and  stock  markets,  and  institutions  encouraging  both 








alike.  An  established  rule  of  law  mechanism  is  capable  of  ensuring  that  firms 
strictly follow  laid down rules and regulations for CG. These laid out rules can be 
made possible by a stable political regime with democratic norms and values that 





The absence of sound  regulatory  frameworks and a  lack of public governance  is 
another reason why developing countries and LDCs must adopt sound regulatory 










to  create  the  appropriate  mechanisms  for  good  CG122.    Well  functional  public 
governance  can  entrench  measures  to  support  anti‐corruption  through  sound 























                                                 
122 See ECA(n.116) p.6 





While  we  cannot  generalize  the  CG  findings  in  some  LDCs  and  developing 
countries with other LDCs and developing countries due to the different corporate 




can  strive  to  increase  access  to  finance  for  SMEs  and  other  local  institutions 
created  to  support economic growth and economic development123.  Since  legal 
frameworks are necessary for firm performance124 especially its CSR obligations to 
the  society,  there  must  be  proper  functioning  of  business  processes  that  are 





the  stakeholder‐agency  theory  because  it  puts  less  emphasis  on  the  rights  of 
shareholders  and  instead  gives  recognition  to  several  groups,  which  have  an 
arguably legitimate claim on the firm. To that extent, it compels every participant 
to  augment  individual  efforts  aimed  at  effectively  contributing  to  corporation's 
objectives for increased firm performance and valuation. In 2006, the WB pointed 
out  that  developing  countries  are  where  globalization,  economic  growth, 
investment,  and  business  activity  were  likely  to  experience  the  most  dramatic 
                                                 
123 A study has contended that country environment such as legal, political, historical and 
cultural factors interlinks can help determine ownership structures, stakeholder priorities 
and including fundamental attitudes towards the role of the company in the economy. See 
generally  P Cornelius, "Corporate Practices and National Governance Systems: What do 
Country Rankings Tell Us?",(2005) GLJ Vol 06 No. 03, pp. 584-604 
 
124 Schreyer provides an account for legal frameworks. For a full discussion, see P 
Schreyer, “High-Growth Firms and Employment", (2000) STI Working Papers 2000/3, 
OECD, Paris. 
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social and environmental  impacts  (both positive and negative)125,  these  impacts 
are  one  of  the  reasons  investors'  confidence  must  be  strengthened  hence 
attaining  a  strong  economic  growth  is  obviously  connected  with  good  CG 
measures for sustainable development. In this case, a strong holistic reform both 
economic  and  social  reforms  would  address  such  developing  countries  like 
Bangladesh wholly126. 
 
It  is  very  important  that  LDCs  and  developing  countries  establish  appropriate 
institutions and capacity building  through  supports  from GCGF and World Bank, 
including  local  and  international CSOs whose  roles  are  crucial  and  important  in 
ensuring that governments and corporate follow ethical governance practices for 
CG  improvement  in  their  different  domains,  putting  into  consideration  local 
customs  and  values.  This  kind  of  step  is  necessary  for  strengthening  economic 
development  for  their  citizens  and  local  infrastructures.  Importantly,  policy 
makers in developing countries and LDCs must work out appropriate frameworks 
to  enhance  strong  environmental  standards  that  would  create  conducive 
environments  for business  sustainability  that would  attract  the  capital  flows127. 





We  cannot generalize  the CG  initiatives and measures based on  that evidences 
from Zambia and the Philippines is the same as pointed out in the dissertation, it 
is very paramount that policy makers in developing countries and LDCs strengthen 
their country’s  legal and  regulatory  frameworks by best codes  that  fit  into  their 
values and corporate systems.   Enforcement and implementation must be taken 
                                                 
125 WB, World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation. 
Washington: World Bank. 
126 See footnote 32 
127 Waller-Hunter and Jones have argued strong environmental standards encourage 
sustainable development for development countries. For a review, see generally J Waller-
Hunter T Jones, “Globalization and Sustainable Development”, (2002) IGES, Vol 3, No 1, 
pp.53-62 




practices and  standards especially disclosure and  transparency  codes which  are 
the  thrusts  for  good  CG  measures  to  withstand  any  external  shocks  to  any 
developing  economy.  Indeed,  this  is  why  corporations,  policy  makers  and 
governments of LDCs and developing countries must pursue sustainable measures 
of  CG  to  bring  about  the  change  needed  for  economic  transformations  for  its 
citizenry.  Corporations  in  developing  countries  and  LDCs  must  incorporate 
corporate behaviour  into their CG experiment to enhance better performance to 
stakeholders  and  shareholders  including  the  society.  This  is why  Estanislao  has 
succinctly presented his thought that:   
“Corporate governance  is  about performance. Corporations must deliver 
good  results  not  only  to  the  shareholders,  but  also  to  all  of  the 
stakeholders, the community, the society and the economy as a whole”128  
 
Therefore,  the ability of corporations  to deliver good  results  to all stakeholders, 
society and economy depends on the economic growth determinants and it is the 
duty  of  the  state  [government]  to  strengthen  these  determinants  in  order  to 
create the environment  for corporations to deliver their CSR obligations. On the 
other hand,  since corporations are viewed as  legal persons,  legal perspective of 
CG  should  define  the  extent  to which  legal measures  can  be  enforced  against 
erring  agents—found  to  have  breached  the  contract  relationship  between 
shareholders and agents. Consequently, it can be established that CG problems in 
developing  countries  and  the  LDCs  are  the  key  factors  militating  against  the 







                                                 
128 Cited at Development Institute’s website. Jesus   Estanislao is the President of the 
Institute of Corporate Directors, Philippines. See “Importance of Corporate Governance” 
at < http://developmentinstitute.org/topics/corpgovernance/> accessed on 11 August 2012  
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